The intellectual colossus that is Steve Baker MP tweeted a link to an article (£) by Dia Chakravarty, the Telegraph’s Brexit Editor, entitled Don’t accept any old deal just to end this limbo and subtitled, A Norway-style Brexit isn’t what people voted for.

Like any self-respecting politician, Baker also takes the opportunity to link to his own Telegraph article on a similar theme from a month earlier. I shall not bother to criticise Baker’s piece partly because it is a month old, and partly because it is so strewn with errors that it would be too easy. When I say ‘errors’, I do not mean ‘slight economies with the truth for rhetorical effect’. At least five times, for example, he writes “EEA” (European Economic Area” when “EFTA” (the European Free Trade Association) would have been more accurate, or more honest. 

Let’s turn, then, to Ms Chakravarty’s comment piece in the Sunday Telegraph. Given that Ms Chakravarty has been drinking the Hard Brexit Kool-Aid for some time, the tone of the article is unsurprising. She begins by expressing surprise at rumours that a growing number of MPs are favourably disposed towards a Norway-style Brexit:

Just because MPs asserted their authority by stamping on a Lords’ amendment, it does not follow that they were firmly opposed to EEA participation then, nor that they cannot have changed their minds subsequently. Does anyone seriously think that MPs have a grasp of the facts when it comes to Brexit, EFTA and the EU? I cannot think of a single MP who has managed to avoid podostomaisis over Brexit. Almost a year after triggering §50, MPs messaging one another on WhatsApp were apparently confused about what the EU Customs Union is. These were not just any old MPs, but members of the European Research Group. 

It’s a minor point, but look at how Ms Chakravarty frames the language. A Norway-style Brexit would not just see the UK remain within the Single Market (SM), but within “the EU single market”. You could say that the EEA is the means whereby non-EU states have access to and participate in the EU SM, or that the EEA extends the EU SM but it is not, strictly speaking, accurate to call the EEA “the EU single market” because, as the EU’s own fact sheet on the topic explains, “the EEA Agreement does not establish binding provisions in all sectors of the internal market.” Calling the EEA “the EU single market” is, of course, a subliminal suggestion that any continued participation in the Single Market is, somehow, ‘remaining in the EU’ and thus, ‘not Brexit’.

What follows is a subjective interpretation of the EU Referendum result:

As I have argued at length elsewhere, this is nothing more than an opinion without logical force. The 2016 Referendum on UK membership of the EU was a choice between two propositions, namely that the UK should leave the EU, or remain a member of the EU. The referendum did not present voters with any detail about the manner of leaving. It is worth noting, too, that the ‘Remain’ option did not present any detail about what retaining membership would involve, either. The EU is a work in progress, committed to ‘ever closer union’ but with a long way to go. Thus, a vote to remain was simply that — to retain membership — and not necessarily a vote in favour of currency union, fiscal union, etc. Brexit was assumed by Mrs May (at the urging of her hopeless adviser Nick Timothy) to also mean leaving any kind of Single Market and withdrawing from the Customs Union. You may think that remaining part of the Customs Union is either legally impossible or politically foolish, you may even think that staying within the Single Market is foolish; but neither is logically inconsistent with leaving the EU.

To put it as briefly as possible: The referendum was an instruction to the UK government to cancel our membership of the EU. How the UK relates to the EU as a non-member is a matter for the UK government, and there are a number of possible scenarios. One such scenario is to seek a relationship like the one Norway has with the EU. In order to claim that such a relationship “is not Brexit”, then you must prove that Norway is a member of the EU. As Norway is demonstrably not a member of the EU, your claim that EFTA membership and EEA participation is “not Brexit” is false. You may not like it — you may prefer the cakes and unicorns fantasy of a “WTO Rules” “No Deal” Brexit — but you cannot alter the fact.

I have no disagreement with Ms Chakravarty’s next point:

Next comes the first of only two arguments (sic) against a Norway option:

This is a very odd claim. It is true that the Single Market is services is not just incomplete but almost non-existent in some areas. It is also true that although the EEAA covers “services” (§§36-39) this area of the economy is not as important to Norway and Iceland as it is to the UK. However, it is not clear why EEA participation would “surrender control” of the UK services sector (and yet, as is implied, not of our manufacturing sector). She seems to imply that being outside the Customs Union (CU) means that we would not be “rule takers” for goods, yet still “rule takers” for services.

The kindest thing would be to say that the entire paragraph is very confused. To be less kind, but more accurate, we might say that it is utter nonsense. She claims that (out of the CU and, perhaps(?) in a Norway-like relationship) we would have “control over our trade policy”. But services are also traded. Does she mean ‘trade in goods’ policy?

Ms Chakravarty might be confused about the extent to which services are, in fact, covered by SM (and thus EEA) regulation. Earlier this year, the veteran commentator on Brexit Dr Richard North used the example of passenger lifts. In the case of one major company, they derived 36% of their revenue from new installations, 16% from modernisations, and a whopping 48% from routine maintenance contracts. Bearing in mind that even new installations and modernisation projects entail a significant services element, North concluded that it is “fair to say that lift manufacturing companies are primarily services. Yet the industry is fully regulated within the framework of the Single Market.” The distinction between goods and services is not as clear as many suppose.

The author ignores, moreover, something that even proponents of a Norway-style Brexit often ignore. When we talk about a “Norway-style” future, we mean ‘Norway-like’ in the sense of EFTA membership and EEA participation. The ‘Norway Option’ is not a ready-made, off-the-shelf plan that we can simply slot into with no changes required. No two members of EFTA, and no two members of EFTA within the EEA, have exactly the same ‘deal’ (as the large number of annexes and protocols to the EEAA shows). With a very different economy and very different requirements, the UK would have to seek considerable country-specific adaptations to the EEAA. Just because something works for Norway it may not work for the UK, but that is not the same thing as saying that an EFTA+EEA relationship could not work for the UK.

Next comes the second (and final) point:

This is the old “pay, no say” argument beloved of Remainers like David Cameron and foaming EUrophiles like Denis MacShane; and fans of a Norway-style Brexit are becoming bored of pointing out why it is untrue. It is also somewhat odd that while Leavers are remarkably quick to dismiss predictions and warnings from Remainers as “project fear”, when it comes to trashing the Norway option, Remainers (even “arch-Remainers” like Vicky Ford MP) are quoted in hushed, reverential tones. In recent post, I suggested why so many Remainers are so keen to rush to judgment.

To understand in more detail why Ms Chakravarty’s assertion is without merit, you could do worse than consult a recent Twitter thread by @AdrianYalland. However, it is worth raising a few points here and now. The first is that, with respect to Norway (and other EFTA+EEA states), it is misleading to talk about “EU laws” (and the figure of 75% has been debunked ad nauseam). What applies to EEA states is legislation with EEA relevance. That does not mean all EU legislation, or even all EU Single Market legislation. And whilst EFTA+EEA countries (viz. Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein) do not have the same ability to “have a say” on “EU laws”, they certainly have the opportunity to shape and influence EEA relevant legislation in ways that they consider fair and effective.

The difficulty with obsessing about “taking control of our borders and our laws” is what such control is assumed to entail. Just as “control of our borders” is often a shorthand for “closing our borders”, so “control of our laws” is inferred to mean rejecting any measure of international regulation. Neither is realistic, and both are arbitrary. The UK has operated various kinds of Common Travel Area with the Republic of Ireland for almost 100 years, and yet I have yet to hear any suggestion that this represents a lack of ‘control’ over our national borders. Similarly, any warning that we will be unable to control “our laws” suggests something rather more fundamental than agreeing about the standard size of a wine bottle.

Increasingly, these “laws” with which we must “comply” are set at an international level, not in Brussels. However much the free-market idealists among us might wish for greater deregulation of international trade, in the real world, regulatory systems matter. What is so often given (by Remainers) as a reason to cling to the EU — i.e. fear of losing ‘our seat at the table’ — is, in fact, a good reason to leave the EU. This is because in so doing we will gain a seat at the tables of the international regulatory bodies (like UNECE, Codex, and the like). This is something that Leavers like Boris Johnson during the Referendum campaign (talking about bananas) and Mrs May soon after it (talking about food labels) failed to understand. They railed against pettifogging ‘Brussels rules’, unaware that most of the rules to which they referred originated from the international body for food standards, Codex Alimentarius.

In this regard, as well as in others, it is Brussels (the EU) itself which is a ‘rule taker’. Norway, if anything, is the ‘rule setter’ (or one of them) because, unlike EU member states, she has her own seat on Codex. Do not suppose that Norway is an insignificant player, either. When it comes to setting market standards for fish and seafood, Norway chairs (and mainly hosts) the Codex Committee on Fish and Fishery Products (CCFFP). Of course, fishing is of great importance for Norway, but one would not expect them to contribute to international standards on, say, automotive manufacturing (having no domestic industry), surely?

Standards for motor vehicles are largely the work of a UNECE body called the World Forum for the Harmonisation of Vehicle Regulations, which meets in Geneva. The car manufacturing giants of Japan and South Korea — neither of which is ever accused of being a ‘Brussels Rule Taker’ — are signatories to its agreements. The UK is currently represented by the EU, so we have 1/28th of a seat, in effect. Norway, on the other hand, is a full member of UNECE in her own right and so despite having no vehicle manufacturing sector of her own (apart from one tiny electric car called “Buddy”) has a full seat at ‘the table’.

It is not quite true, either, that Norway ‘must comply’ with EU legislation, or even with EEA-relevant legislation. In practice, legislation is rarely rejected, but the facts are still important. There is a ‘right of reservation’ which means that unlike EU member states where there is a principle of ‘direct effect’ and EU legislative acts automatically become law, EFTA+EEA states must incorporate legislation into domestic law. Freedom to reject a particular piece of legislation might have consequences for EEA participation (like excluding a particular sector), but it is theoretically possible.

After only two, somewhat weak and debatable argument against a Norway-style Brexit, Ms Chakravarty concludes: 

Employing what is a common move by Leavers, we see here the Humpty Dumpty school of semantics at work, in which a word (in this case ‘Brexit’) “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” Brussels does not control the laws, money or borders of Norway. Norway, as a sovereign nation, has her own commercial policy and the ability to sign trade deals on her own behalf as well as in concert with other EFTA states.

As a signatory to an international agreement (note, not through membership of a political union), she accepts a certain amount of rules and regulations in order to participate in a single market. She pays contributions to those EU agencies and projects in which she participates, rather than into the EU operational budget. She provides development aid to countries in Eastern Europe and Southern Europe to promote and strengthen free trade. Norway, as a signatory of the EEAA (not qua member of the EU) has agreed to reciprocal free movement of labour within the EEA, but being outside the EU, she does not recognise “EU citizenship”. You or I (assuming you are British too) could go to Oslo to work, but if we failed to find employment we would have to leave after 3 months and could not claim state assistance.

At this point, some Leavers will claim that in voting to leave the EU we also voted to leave the Single Market or we implicitly voted for a form of Brexit that explicitly excluded a Norway-like option. In doing so they will claim, perhaps, that during the campaign, David Cameron told us that a vote to leave meant leaving the Single Market, or Nigel Farage said that EFTA+EEA wasn’t real Brexit. But to return to the ballot paper, the wording of the question was not preceded by the qualification, “Based on what you have heard during the last three months alone…” Perhaps voters had read a book by Daniel Hannan in which he clearly argued for a Brexit which would see us become like a different EFTA member: Switzerland? Perhaps they had read a speech by Owen Paterson, in which he argued for precisely the Norway model? Perhaps they had heard Nigel Farage extol the virtues of “Norway” over and over again?

I cannot argue with the conclusion of Ms Chakravarty’s article. But it is also advice she should heed herself. She ought not to insult the intelligence of her readers by misrepresenting the nature of EFTA+EEA states. Most importantly, though, she should not pretend that “what we voted for” is anything other, and therefore anything more, than leaving the EU.